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ARGUMENT 
Ii APPELLEES ARGUMENT RELIES IN PART ON 
FACTS WHICH ARE NOT SUPPORTED BY THE RECORD. 
a. Mrs. Shrader the predecessor in interest to Hanrath did 
not testify that she "inspected the property". Her 
testimony at pages 166-167 of the trial transcript was that 
she and her husband "walked back in there and walked up and 
down the river for a little bit and looked around; looked at 
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the trees and whatever was there and walked back out and 
left". 
Mrs. Shrader never claims to have "inspected" the property. 
In fact, when asked by counsel about "inspecting the property" 
she corrected him by saying that they walked the property. (Tr. 
166). It is clear that she and her husband casually visited the 
property; they did not even walk the entire parcel. Carter's use 
of the word "inspect" implies that there was a close examination 
of the parcel and that was simply not the case. 
b. Appellee argues that when Defendant's purchased the 
property they were aware of the existence of the "old 
established fence lines" and that Plaintiff Carter and his 
predecessors in interest had exclusively occupied, improved, 
developed and claimed ownership of said property within 
confines of said "ancient fence lines and the ledges and 
cliffs". (Tr. 43-54 120-125). This mischaracterizes the 
testimony of Shrader and Hanrath. 
Appellee's citations to the transcript record in support of 
this allegation are to testimony of Osborne Carter and Delbert 
Broadhead. There is absolutely no testimony from the Hanraths 
that they knew that Carter was claiming ownership of the property 
prior to their purchase. This is a rural area, not a 
subdivision. Defendants relied upon a plat map in ascertaining a 
general idea of the scope of their property prior to its 
purchase. 
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Shirley Hanrath specifically testified that she was not told 
that the Carters were occupying property she purchased from 
Shrader. (Tr. 241). Likewise Shrader testified that she was 
never aware that someone else was occupying her land. (Tr. 167, 
171). The first time Hanrath knew that the Carters were claiming 
possession of the property was after she had purchased the 
property and was attempting to erect a fence along the property 
boundaries (Tr. 242). 
The accurate representation of these facts is important 
because they bear directly on the issue of acquiescence and it is 
appellants position in this appeal that Carter failed to 
establish acquiescence to the alleged boundary line. 
II. OCCUPATION OF THE PROPERTY FOR A LONG 
PERIOD OF TIME WITHOUT DISPUTE IS 
INSUFFICIENT TO ESTABLISH A BOUNDARY BY 
ACQUIESCENCE. 
a. The facts do not support a finding of acquiescence. 
Carter argues that he and his predecessors occupied the 
property up to a definite fence line and certain ledges and 
cliffs. The record certainly supports that they used and 
occupied the land in question as if it was theirs. Appellants 
dispute the fact that the fence and the ledges and cliffs 
imparted notice to them or their predecessor that the Carters 
were treating them as a boundary and occupying the property up to 
them. In fact, Mrs Hanrath testified at page 227 that she had 
observed only "a partial fence line between the Carters and the 
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hanrath property" and that she observed the fence went North to 
a point where the brush became too thick to observe a fence (if 
one existed) through there• 
More importantly though, Carter has not established any 
acquiescence on the part of Hanrath or her predecessor. 
Occupation of property alone is insufficient to establish a 
boundary by acquiescence. In the present case the Hanrath's 
predecessor, Mrs. Shrader, was a non-resident landowner. She 
visited the property once for approximately 45 minutes. Her 
testimony was that she did not observe any one else occupying 
what she believed to be her property. The record is devoid of 
any evidence that Shrader acquiesced in the fence, ledges and 
cliffs as the boundary of her property. 
This case differs significantly from the situation in most 
boundary by acquiescence cases where the adjoining landowners 
occupy their respective parcels up to a mutually agreed upon 
boundary. The doctrine of boundary by acquiescence was designed 
to protect those landowners who had been mutually relying on a 
certain boundary from enforcement of a legal description which 
might differ from the understood boundary. Here the Carter's 
adjoining landowner prior to Hanrath could not acquiesce because 
she had no knowledge of their occupation of her property. 
b. The law does not support a finding of acquiescence. 
Occupation up to certain ledges, cliffs and fences by one of 
the landowners is not sufficient. The elements set forth in 
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Staker v. Ainsworth, 785 P.2d 417 (Utah 1990) must be read 
together: 
1. occupation up to a visible line marked definitely 
by monuments, fences or buildings; 
2. acquiescence in the line as the boundary; 
3. for a long period of time; and 
4. by adjoining landowners. 
If these elements are read together it is clear that the 
adjoining landowners must both occupy up to the visible line and 
acquiesce in that line as the boundary for a long period if time. 
While the Hanraths have conceded that their land adjoins the 
Carter property, they do dispute that adjoining landowners have 
occupied the property to the cliffs, ledges and fence. The 
predecessor to Hanrath was a non-resident owner and did not 
"occupy" the property at any time. 
Likewise, neither Mrs Shrader nor Mrs. Hanrath ever 
acquiesced in the fence, ledges of cliffs as a boundary. The 
elements for a boundary by acquiescence require both landowners 
to occupy up to and recognize a fence or monument as the 
boundary. This element has not been met in this case. 
Carter relies on Hobson v. Panguitch. 530 P.2d 792 (Utah 
1975); for the proposition that establishment of a boundary 
"requires the acceptance, or the giving of consent or approval by 
words or conduct over some substantial period of time . . .". A 
review of the record on appeal indicates that it is devoid of any 
evidence that the Hanraths or their predecessors gave consent or 
approval over a substantial period of time. Consent or approval 
implies knowledge and neither Shrader nor the Hanraths knew that 
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the Carters were claiming a portion of their property. The only 
possible claim of knowledge is that Shrader saw horses or cattle 
which apparently belonged to the Carters, "way down the way". 
The Carters place a great deal of weight on the fact that 
the disputed boundaries were acquiesced to by the "community" for 
a long period of time. Staker is clear on this issue, the 
acquiescence must be between "adjoining landowners". The fact 
that his neighbors believed that he owned all the property he was 
occupying has absolutely no relevance. 
Cartels brief states erroneously that "the Hanraths are 
urging this Court to adopt either the 'objective7 or 'subjective7 
tests in determining whether there was uncertainty or dispute as 
to whether there was a boundary by acquiescence". Carter has 
clearly misinterpreted Hanrath's argument. 
The objective and subjective tests referred to in the 
context of the Hanrath brief were used by the courts in 
determining whether there was acquiescence by the adjoining 
landowners. The Hanraths identified the tests in their brief as 
a means of informing this court of the various methods which have 
been used to determine whether there has been acquiescence. The 
objective test relies on the actual conduct, words, etc. of the 
landowners in determining whether there was acquiescence in a 
boundary. Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199 (1973). 
The subjective test looks beyond actual conduct to inaction 
and silence. Wright v. Clissold. 521 P.2d 1224 (Utah 1974). 
However, the inaction and silence indicates acquiescence only 
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where the adjoining landowners have knowledge that the line is 
being treated as a boundary of their properties. 
Acquiescence is more nearly synonymous with 
"indolence" or "consent by silence", or a 
knowledge that a fence or other monuments 
appears to be a boundary - but that no one 
did anything about it for forty-eight (48) 
years. 
Lane v. Walker, 29 Utah 2d 119, 505 P.2d 1199, 1200 (1973). 
If a party claiming title by acquiescence fails to establish 
any of the elements which give rise to a presumption in his 
favor, then he has not proved his case. Fuoco v. Williams, 18 
Utah 2d 282, 421 P.2d 944, 946 (1966). The evidence introduced 
at the trial of this matter simply does not support a finding 
that there was acquiescence in any fence, ledge or cliff as a 
boundary by adjoining landowners and consequently the trial court 
erred in quieting title to the subject property in Mr. Carter. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant Hanraths ask that this Court reverse the ruling of 
the trial court quieting title in the Plaintiff and order that 
they be allowed full possession of their property as it is 
legally described on their deed and the corresponding plat map. 
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